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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction rests with this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: The trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of 
substantial partial performance and in only applying the statute of frauds 
analysis. 
Standard of Review: De novo. "Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed 'for correctness' giving no 
deference to the [trial] court's interpretation." Centennial Inv. Co., LLC, v. 
Nuttall, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) {citations omitted). A review of 
summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory 
interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no deference given to 
the trial court's legal conclusion. Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Preservation for Appeal: Record at pages 50-54. 
Issue 2: The trial court erred in failing to deem the statute of frauds 
was satisfied where grantor admits that agent has authority to act on his behalf 
2 
and agent signs document conveying interest in real property. 
Standard of Review: De novo. "Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed 'for correctness5 giving no 
deference to the [trial] court's interpretation." Centennial Investment 
Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 
2007) (citations omitted), A review of summary proceedings under Utah 
Code Ann., § 38-9-7 calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question 
of law; there is no deference given to the trial court's legal conclusion. 
Russell v. Thomas, 999 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Preservation for Appeal: Record at pages 50-54. 
Issue 3: The District Court erred in dismissing Frank Fu's counter-
claim and cross-claim at the conclusion of the of the wrongful lien hearing, 
i.e. does a counter-claim survive the final order where the initial lawsuit is for 
a wrongful lien? 
3 
Standard of Review: De novo. "Questions of statutory interpretation 
are . . . questions of law that are reviewed 'for correctness' giving no 
deference to the [trial] court's interpretation." Centennial Investment 
Company, LLC, v. Nuttall, 2007 UT App. 321, 171 P.2d 458 (Utah Ct. App. 
2007). A review of summary proceedings under Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-7 
calls for statutory interpretation and presents a question of law; there is no 
deference given to the trial court's legal conclusion. Russell v. Thomas, 999 
P.2d 1244, 1246 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Preservation for Appeal: Frank Fu argued that the counter-claims and 
cross-claims should not be dismissed. 
4 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS OR RULES 
Constitution Provisions: The due process clause at Art. I, § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution which states "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 
Statutory Provisions: 
1) Utah Code Ann., § 38-9-1, et seq. Wrongful Liens and Wrongful 
Judgment Liens. See Addendum "A" at the end of brief. 
2) Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1. See Addendum "B" at the end of brief. 
3) Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1. See Addendum "C" at the end of brief. 
Rules: 
Rule 13(b) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure: "A pleading may state 
as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out of 
the transaction of occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing 
party's claim." 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case & Procedural History 
The issue in this case is whether Frank Fu's notice of interest on Tolin 
is proper or wrongful. Joseph Naso and Rene (Naso) Evans filed a complaint 
against Frank Fu on April 1, 2008, alleging that his notice of interest filed on 
two pieces of real property, Brandonwood and Tolin, constituted a wrongful 
lien. Frank Fu filed counter-claims and third-party claims alleging breach of 
contract, foreclosure, fraudulent transfer, common law fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. These claims were filed because Frank Fu believes that 
Clyde Rhodes and Joseph Naso, among others, conspired together to cheat 
him out of the $105,000.00 he paid for an interest in real property in this case, 
plus other money he loaned totaling about $50,000.00. 
Judge Deno Himonas started an expedited hearing on Joseph Naso and 
Rene (Naso) Evans' wrongful lien claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 39-9-
7, late in the afternoon on June 15th and finished it on the 16th. 
At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Himonas ruled that Frank Fu's 
notice of interest on Brandonwood was proper but as to Tolin it was wrongful. 
Judge Himonas reasoned that while Rene (Naso) Evans had signed a warranty 
6 
deed conveying her interest in Tolin, Joseph Naso had not signed the warranty 
deed or any document conveying his interest and thus the applicable statute of 
frauds was not satisfied. Judge Himonas ruled as he did even though Frank 
Fu paid $105,000,000 which was supposed to include an interest in both 
Brandonwood and Tolin. 
The Order finding the wrongful lien was signed by Judge Deno 
Himonas on May 12, 2008. Judge Himonas also dismissed Frank Fu's 
counter-claims and third-party claim. Frank Fu appeals those decisions. 
Statement of Facts 
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows: Joseph and 
Rene Evans (Naso) knew that an interest in two pieces of property, 
Brandonwood and Tolin, were being offered by Clyde Rhodes to Frank Fu. 
(See R. at page 51-52.) There is no issue as to whether Rene Naso transferred 
her interest to Frank Fu through her agent Clyde Rhodes, see R. at p. 59:25, 
and 60:1-14, the only issue is whether Joseph Naso did because he did not 
sign the warranty deed. 
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Joseph Naso testified under oath that he "knew [Clyde Rhodes] was 
acting for us," see R. at pp. 55:25 and 56:1-4, i.e. on behalf of Joseph and 
Rene Naso. Joseph Naso also testified that he intended Tolin to be part of a 
buyout that was being brokered by Clyde Rhodes, see Court Transcript at 
55:25 and 56:1-2, and knew that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of 
the buyout. (See Court Transcript at pp. 55:4-9, 53, 52, 52:10-16 and R. at p. 
74-75, 66, 51:7-8, 52:8-9.) And, as part of that buyout, Frank Fu paid the sum 
of $105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes, via his dba L20 Homes, LLC and PGI 
Management, Inc., and Frank Fu was supposed to receive an interest in both 
Brandonwood and Tolin. See R. at pp 51-52, 77, and 84. Because Clyde 
Rhodes, Joseph Naso and Rene Evans refused to acknowledge Frank Fu's 
interest in Tolin he filed a notice of interest on the same. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, Joseph Naso intended to convey his interest in real property 
to Frank Fu through his agent Clyde Rhodes. His agent Clyde Rhodes signed 
a document conveying that interest and Frank Fu paid $105,000.00 for the 
8 
interest. The only missing piece in the case is a document Joseph Naso signed 
giving his agent authority to convey his interest in the property. However this 
missing piece should be deemed satisfied since Joseph Naso testified under 
oath that Clyde Rhodes is his agent, he intended to convey his interest in Tolin 
to Frank Fu and new that Frank Fu was relying on Tolin being part of the deal. 
The facts of this case satisfy the doctrine of substantial performance and 
should also be deemed to have complied with the statute of frauds. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's decision that Frank Fu's notice of interest on Tolin is a 
wrongful lien is not correct. The actions by the parties in this case satisfy the 
doctrine of "sufficient partial performance" or the requisite statute of frauds 
and therefore Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin. The trial court did not 
consider the doctrine of sufficient partial performance and should have. And, 
under the principles of general agency law the statute of frauds should also be 
deemed to be met. Additionally, the trial court's dismissal of Frank Fu's 
9 
counter-claims and third-party claims is in error, as such claims are 
specifically allowed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(b) even in a wrongful lien 
action. 
I. JOSEPH NASO'S INTEREST IN TOLIN WAS 
TRANSFERRED TO FRANK FU UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF "SUFFICIENT 
PARTIAL PERFORMANCE." 
In Utah an interest in real property may be transferred orally outside the 
statute of frauds under the equitable doctrine of "sufficient partial 
performance." The Utah Supreme Court set forth the elements for Sufficient 
Partial Performance in Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002), as 
follows: 
[1] the oral contract must be clear and definite; [2] 
the acts done in performance of the contract must 
be equally clear and definite; and [3] the act must 
be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in 
reliance must be such that they would not have 
been performed had the contract not existed, and 
(b) the failure to perform on the part of the 
promisor would result in fraud on the performer 
who relied since damages would be inadequate. 
10 
The word "oral" also includes acts. Id. 
This case meets every required element for Sufficient Partial 
Performance set forth in Warr and the trial court should have found the 
transfer of property valid. 
A. The terms of the oral contract are clear. 
The terms of the contract between Frank Fu and Joseph Naso are clear 
and are as follows: Frank Fu was to pay the sum of $105,000.00 to Clyde 
Rhodes, the actual and apparent agent1 of Joseph Naso and in exchange Frank 
Fu was to receive an interest in property including Tolin. There can be no 
reasonable dispute that these are the terms and information set forth below 
establishes the same. 
After various negotiations, Clyde Rhodes sent an email to Frank Fu on 
July 18, 2007, which contained the Tolin property and stated that "Joey and 
1
 It cannot be reasonably disputed that Clyde Rhodes is the agent of Joseph 
Naso in this transaction. Joseph Naso admitted that Clyde Rhodes had 
authority to offer Tolin in the package deal and intended that it be offered. 
See Court Transcript at pp. 50-53 and R. at pp. 66, 74-75. And Joseph Naso 
testified that "I knew he was acting for us . . . ." See Court Transcript at pp. 
55:25 and 56:1-4. 
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Rene are committed. No turning back" and that he needed a$1105000.00 
before Monday evening" because Joey Naso is going out of town. R. at p. 74-
75. 
At the hearing it was pointed out to Mr. Naso that the email stated 
"Joey and Rene are committed, no turning back," see Court Transcript at p. 
55:4, Joseph responded with "Yes, that sounds right." See Court Transcript at 
p. 55:6. And again he was asked, "so you were committed and there was no 
turning back?" he responded with "Yes." See Court Transcript at p. 55:6-9. 
Frank Fu was also given a spreadsheet from Clyde Rhodes that was 
captioned "FRANK FU - BUY-OUT - JOEY NASO AND RENE EVANS" 
and this spreadsheet included the Tolin property. See R. at p. 66. Joseph 
Naso admits that he saw this spreadsheet but would not confirm when he saw 
it. See R. at p. 66. 
Joseph Naso also testified at the hearing when referring to the deal "At 
one point I told Clyde, sounds good, sounds okay . . . ."3 And when Joseph 
9 
There is no dispute that the amount was later reduced to $105,000.00 as this 
is the most money the bank would loan Frank Fu at the time. 
12 
Naso was asked "Did you know that Tolin Street was part of a potential 
buyout?" by Frank Fu he answered "I did. I knew it was part of it." See R. at 
p 51:7-8. Under additional questioning Mr. Naso was asked if he "knew that 
Tolin Street was part of the buyout. . ." he responded "Yes, I did." See R. at 
p 52:8-9. 
He was also asked "Did you know that Mr. Fu was relying on Tolin 
Street being part of the deal?" and he answered "Yes, I knew that, Yes, I knew 
that." See Court Transcript at p. 53. And when Joseph Naso was asked " . . . 
you did intend Tolin Street - you knew Tolin Street was going to be part of 
the deal?" he responded "Yes." See Court Transcript at p. 52.) And again 
when asked if he "intended it to be part of the deal?" he responded "That's 
correct." Id. 
3
 Joseph qualifies this statement by adding that when he got the paperwork he 
did not sign it claiming he got "cold feet." See Court Transcript p. 54:22-25 
and p. 55:1-4. However, there is no indication ever that this message was 
conveyed to Frank Fu who actually paid the money. 
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Additionally, it is clear that the purchase price Mr. Fu was to pay for the 
interest in Tolin, and other property, was $105,000.004. See Court Transcript 
atp. 52:10-16. 
Based on the foregoing it is clear that Joseph Naso intended to sell his 
interest in Tolin to Frank Fu, that Clyde Rhodes had authority to broker the 
deal, that Joseph Naso intended it to be part of the deal, and knew full well 
that Frank Fu was relying on it to be part of the deal. And finally, that the 
price that was to be paid for an interest in Tolin and other property was 
$105,000.00 and that the sum was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes. See Record at 
p. 52:11-12. 
B. The acts done in performance are also clear and definite. 
4
 Mr. Naso testified that of the $105,000.00 paid to Clyde Rhodes, he and 
Rene were to get $60,000.00 which they would then split. See Record at p. 
52:11-12. 
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The next question is what was done in performance that was also clear 
and definite. All of the points set forth in section "A." immediately above 
apply, i.e. the emails, the spread-sheets, the expectations and reliance by the 
parties and based on the communications, the spreadsheets, the expectations 
and reliance on these and other representations, Frank Fu obtained a loan from 
Washington Mutual Bank for $105,000.00. See R. at p. 72. Further, Clyde 
Rhodes signed a Promissory Note for the $105,000.00, the amount Frank Fu 
paid and the Note had as its security an interest in all of the assets of L205 
which includes Tolin. See R. at pp. 72 and 84. And, Frank Fu paid the 
$105,000.00 to Clyde Rhodes. While Joseph Naso testified that he never 
received the $60,000.00 of the $105,000.00 that he was supposed to receive 
from Clyde Rhodes, this was never contemplated to be part of the contract and 
no one has ever asserted that it was; that agreement was strictly between 
5
 Clyde Rhodes conducted this transaction through a couple different names, 
PGI Management, Inc. and L20 Homes, LLC. L20 Homes, LLC was never 
created, see R. at p. 14:6-8, and therefore the check for the $105,000.00 was 
paid to PGI, Inc. See R. Court Transcript at p.72. Additionally Frank Fu was 
to be 50% owner in L20 Homes, LLC and is at least a partner with Clyde 
Rhodes for purposes of receiving an interest in Tolin. A recent review of the 
Department of Corporations reveals that PGI, Inc. may not have been formally 
created either. 
15 
Joseph Naso and his agent Clyde Rhodes. See Court Transcript 52:8-19. The 
facts remains that the price for an interest in the package of property which 
included Tolin was $105,000.00 and the same was to be paid to Clyde Rhodes 
aka PGI Management, Inc., and it was in fact paid. See Court Transcript p. 
52:11-16 and R. at p. 66, 74-75, 77, 72. 
C. Frank Fu would not have paid the $105,000.00 if there 
was no contract and the failure to perform on the part 
of Joseph Naso results in fraud on Frank Fu. 
The only reason that Frank Fu paid the $105,000.00 was for an interest 
in real property which included Tolin and Frank Fu has never been refunded 
any of the money he paid. As set forth above, Joseph Naso intended Tolin to 
be part of the contract, knew it was part of the contract, and knew that Frank 
Fu was relying on it being part of the contract. Unless this court deems Frank 
Fu's notice of interest is valid and the trial court's decision is reversed, a fraud 
will result on Frank Fu who relied upon the actions and inactions of Joseph 
Naso and the representations and actions of his agent Clyde Rhodes. 
16 
D. Summary of Substantial Partial Performance. 
The trial court did not consider substantial partial performance when 
analyzing Frank Fu's Notice of Interest. It relied merely on the fact that 
Joseph Naso did not sign the warranty deed transferring his interest. Frank Fu 
argued that the Joseph Naso should be estopped in claiming it did not transfer 
his interest, see Court Transcript at p. 61, he also argued that the court would 
be sanctioning a fraud, see Court Transcript at pp. 43:25 and 44:1-10, if it 
failed to find his Notice of Interest was valid. All of the elements of the 
elements of substantial partial performance are met and this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court so that the trial court's decision can be corrected. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, FRANK FU'S NOTICE 
OF INTEREST IS NOT A WRONGFUL LIEN 
BECAUSE HE HAD AN ARGUABLE BASIS 
FOR FILING THE SAME AND HIS 
ARGUMENTS ARE SUPPORTED BY 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 
Alternatively, Frank Fu's notice of interest is a lien allowed by statute 
and not in violation of wrongful lien act. A lien is not wrongful if at the time 
it is recorded it is expressly authorized by statute. See Utah Code Ann,, § 38-
17 
9-l(6)(a). The Marketable Record Title Act at Utah Code Ann., § 57-9-1 
states: 
Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep 
effective such interest by filing for recording during the forty-
year period immediately rolling the effective date of the root 
title of the person whose record title would otherwise be 
marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath, setting 
forth the nature of the claim. 
In this case, Frank Fu obtained an interest in Tolin under the doctrine of 
substantial partial performance as argued above. Being thus qualified, Frank 
Fu is permitted to file his notice of interest pursuant to the Marketable Record 
Title Act which exempts it as a wrongful lien. See Utah Code Ann., 38-9-
1(6) (a). The trial court erred when it failed to recognize Frank Fu's interest as 
a statutorily lawful claim. 
Joseph Naso may argue that Frank Fu did not have an interest in Tolin 
because while Rene Evans (Naso) had signed the warranty deed, Joseph Naso 
did not and this exact scenario was already litigated and decided in Centennial 
Inv. Co., LLC v. Nuttal, 171 P.3d 458, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). If the facts 
stopped there, they would be correct; however, the facts do not stop there. 
18 
This case is different from Centennial in that equitable doctrines set forth 
above give Frank Fu an interest in Tolin. Joseph Naso's nefarious use of the 
law to perpetrate the fraud should not be condoned. 
III. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD BE 
DEEMED TO BE SATISFIED WHERE A 
PARTY ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT 
THEIR AGENT HAD AUTHORITY TO 
CONVEY LAND AND THE AGENT SIGNED 
A WRITING CONVEYING AN INTEREST IN 
LAND. 
Frank Fu believes that the arguments above are sufficient to prove his 
notice of interest is valid and that it is not a wrongful lien. However, Frank Fu 
also offers this additional argument to prove his case. 
With very few exceptions, the transfer of real property is governed by 
Utah Code Ann,, § 25-5-1 which states in pertinent part as follows: 
"[n]o estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent 
thereunto authorized by writing." 
19 
In this case, the statute of frauds should be deemed to have been 
satisfied, by "operation of law," id., because Clyde Rhodes, acting as Joseph 
Naso's agent, offered Tolin for sale to Frank Fu, Frank Fu accepted the offer 
and paid $105,000.00 for an interest in Tolin and Clyde Rhodes signed a 
document transferring the interest. The only missing element is the signed 
writing between Joseph Naso and Clyde Rhodes giving Clyde Rhodes the 
authority to convey the interest in Tolin. However, this element should be 
deemed satisfied because in this case, Joseph Naso testified that Clyde Rhodes 
had the authority and this should supplant or satisfy the writing element, i.e. 
Joseph Naso should be estopped from claiming that Clyde Rhodes signature is 
his signature. 
The problem with summary proceedings such as one conducted under 
Utah Code Ann., 38-9-7(3)(b) is that the non-moving party has no time to 
conduct discovery. In a case like this, discovery is crucial. Joseph Naso 
admitted under oath that he intended to sell his interest in Tolin and knew that 
his agent was trying to do so and there was apparent express and apparent 
authority for his agent to sell Tolin. Additionally, there was a signed writing 
20 
by the agent selling or assigning the interest to Frank Fu. See R. at pp. 74-75, 
77 and 84. With discovery, Frank Fu, with an almost certainty, would have 
discovered a signed writing to satisfy the statute of frauds requirement. Given 
Frank Fu's counter-claims and cross claims, see R. at pp. 18-33, the court 
should have at a minimum allowed the case to proceed and should not have 
decided the case under the summary proceedings so that Frank Fu could have 
conducted discovery. 
While the summary proceeding section provides a great protection to 
shield those that have been the victim of a wrongful lien, it should not be used 
as a sword to create another victim that is entitled to a lien. The summary 
proceeding in this case has denied Frank Fu of his due process rights provided 
for by the Utah Constitution at Art. I., § 7. In this case there is almost no 
doubt if Frank Fu was allowed to conduct discovery he would have been able 
to marshal evidence to support his claim. 
In a case such as this case, where the weight of evidence suggests that 
the non-moving party will likely prevail in the normal course of litigation, a 
summary proceeding effectively denies Mr. Fu of his right to due process. 
21 
This matter should be remanded to the trial court with the instruction 
that the matter proceed under the normal course of litigation so that discovery 
may be conducted. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded to the trial court so that it can consider 
the doctrine of substantial performance or find that the statute of frauds has 
been met or to allow for additional discovery to be completed. 
DATED this I ^ day of October 2008. 
Brp^G^fykaTnp 
Attorney for Appellant Frank Fu 
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Randy Birch 
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38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within scope of employment—Good 
faith requirement. 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages. 
3 8-9-5. Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien—Penalties. 
38-9-6. Petition to file lien—Notice to record interest holders—Summary relief— 
Contested petition. 
38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien—Notice to lien claimant—Summary relief—Finding of 
wrongful lien—Wrongful lien is void. 
§ 3 8 - 9 - 1 . Definitions 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title 
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property 
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the 
state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain 
real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a 
^resent, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, 
itleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and 
nterest in that real property appears in the county recorder's records for the 
ounty in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in 
ertain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for 
le county in which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
icumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
ws 1997, c. 125, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997. 
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Fuiinei S 33-9-1 , aenved Irom Laws 1985 c 
182, related to liability oi person fiimg wrongful 
Lcn 
Cross Re fe r ences 
Recording ol judgment m registry/ of judgments, see § 78-22-1 5 
R e s e a r c h R e f e r e n c e s 
ALR Library Treatises and Fractice Aids 
61 A L R 4 t h 464, What Constitutes Negh- Punitive Damages State-by-Statc Guide 
gence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable § 8 54 Utah 
to Person Other Than Immediate Client 
Motes of Dec i s ions 
Liabilities to third persons 2 
Wrongful lien 1 
1. Wrongful lien 
The statutory 'notice of interest' recorded 
against real property was a "lien" or "encum-
brance," within meaning of statute defining a 
'wrongful hen' m part as a hen or encum-
brance U C A 1 9 5 3 , 38-9-1(6) Russell v 
Thomas, 2000, 999 P 2d 1244, 391 Utah Adv 
Rep 19, 2000 UT App 82 Liens <&=» 16 
Purchaser 's notice of interest m entire 
38-acre tract of land could be considered 
"groundless," under statute authorizing dam-
ages award against party who groundlessly 
claims such an interest in document filed in 
office of county recorder and who willfully re-
fuses to correct record, where purchaser had 
contract for purchase of only 16 acres, and 
evidence was presented that purchaser had re-
ceived requested survey from vendors but re-
fused to designate the 16 acres which were 
subject of parties' agreement or to release its 
notice of interest against other 22 acres U C A 
1953, 38-9-1 Commercial Inv Corp v Sig-
gard, 1997, 936 P 2d 1105, 314 Utah Adv Rep 
41, certiorari denied 945 P 2d 1118 Libel And 
Slander <£= 134 
Notice of interest m real property will be 
considered "groundless," for purposes of statute 
authorizing treble damages award against party 
who groundlessly claims such an interest m 
document filed m office of county recorder and 
who willfully refuses to correct record, if partv 
did not have arguable basis for filing notice or if 
party's reasons for filing notice were not sup-
ported by any credible evidence U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
38-9-1 Commercial Inv Corp v Siggaid 
1997, 936 P 2 d 1105, 314 Utah Adv Rep 4 l ' 
certiorari denied 945 P 2d 1118 Libel And 
S l a n d e r ^ 134 
2. Liabilities to third persons 
Ex-husband's wrongful hen claim against c\-
wife's former attorney, for filing lis pendens 
against husband's property, was not mooted 
when court, m post-dissolution enforcement 
proceedings directed removal of lis pendens and 
substitution of restraining order, as ex-hus-
band's ability to pursue statutory wrongful hen 
claim was not barred upon removal of encum-
brance U C A 1953, 38-9-1 Winters v Schul-
man, 1999, 977 P 2d 1218, 367 Utah Adv Rep 
19, 1999 UT App 119, certiorari denied 994 
P 2d 1271 Attorney And Client <s=» 26 
Out-of-state attorney had reason to know that 
her filing of lis pendens was groundless absent 
pending action affecting title or possession ol 
property, and thus was liable for filing wrongful 
hen, as attorney should have reviewed Utah law 
before filing lis pendens m state, and should 
have determined that lis pendens was not viable 
had she done so U C A 1953, 38-9-1 , 78-40-2 
Winters v Schulman, 1999, 977 P 2d 1218, 367 
Utah Adv Rep 19, 1999 UT App 119, certioran 
denied 994 P 2d 1271 Attorney And Client c=> 
26 
§ 3 8 - 9 - 2 , Scope 
(l)(a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9-5, and 
38-9-6 apply to any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a 
lien pursuant to this chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
Od) The provisions of Sections 33-9-1 and SS-0-'7 cuj\ fc? ?M 1 *n; ot 
record regardless of the date the hen was recorded or filed 
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(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filings a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38 ; Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
Laws 1997, c 125, § 3, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 122, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Former § 38-9-2, derived from Laws 1985, c. porting to claim a lien not authorized by statute, 
182, related to the invalidity of documents pur- judgment, or other specific legal authority. 
§ 38—9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within scope of em-
ployment—Good faith requirement 
(.1) A county recorder may reject recordingjDf a lien if the..county recorder 
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1 . If the 
county recorder rejects the document, the county recorder shall immediately 
return the original document together with a notice that the document was 
rejected pursuant to this section to the person attempting to record or file the 
document or to the address provided on the document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county recorder's employ-
ment, rejects or accepts a document for recording or filing in good faith under 
this section may not be liable for damages except as otherwise provided by law. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court 
order, it shall have no retroactive recording priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any 
remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 4, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Former § 38-9-3, derived from Laws 1985, c. 
182, related to liability of person refusing to 
correct document containing wrongful lien. 
Cross References 
County recorder, powers and duties, see § 17-21-1. 
Library References 
Records <s=>3, 6 to 8. C.J.S. Records §§ 4 to 18. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 326k3; 
326k6 to 326k8. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Punitive Damages State-by-State Guide 
§ 8.54, Utah. 
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§ 38—?~~h Civil liability for liling wrongful iien—Damages 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder 
against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages 
proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or 
correct ihe wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from a 
record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the 
last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, 
and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees 
and costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien 
as defined in Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real 
property, knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 5, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Library References 
Attorney and Client <s=>26 
Libel and Slander <S=130 to 139. 
Lis Pendens <S=>20. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches- 237kl30 to 
237kl39; 45k26; 242k20. 
C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 140. 
C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood 
§§ 204 to 216. 
C.J.S. Lis Pendens §§ 14, 24 to 30, 42. 
Research References 
Notes of Dec i s ions 
Former § 38-9-4, derived from Laws 1985, c. 
182, related to actions to clear title and to costs 
and attorney fees. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 32:25, 
Wrongful liens, damages. 
Persons liable for damages 1 
1. Persons liable for damages 
Trust beneficiary did not willfully refuse to 
release lis pendens placed on trust property that 
was the subject of beneficiary's litigation with 
trustee, end thus beneficiary was not liable for 
damages to trustee under statute requiring lien 
claimant who does not comply with notice re-
quirements and willfully refuses to release hen 
to pay damages U.C.A.1953, 38-9-4, 
38-12-102, 38-12-103. In re Estate of Flake. 
2003, 71 P 3d 589, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 18. 2003 
UT 17, rehearing denied. Lis Pendens <*> 20 
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§ 38—9—5. Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien—Penalties 
(1) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with a county recorder is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Under this Subsection (1), it is an affirmative defense to this offense that the 
person recorded or filed a release of the claim or lien within 20 days from the 
date of written request from a record interest holder that the wrongful lien be 
released. The accused person shall prove this affirmative defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third degree felony 
if, at the time of recording or filing, the person knowingly had no present, 
lawful property interest in the real property and no reasonable basis to believe 
he had a present, lawful property interest in the real property. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar a prosecution for any act in violation of 
Section 76-8-414. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10 
Library References 
Libel and Slander 3>141. C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood 
Lis Pendens <s=>20. § 7. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 242k20; C.J.S. Lis Pendens §§ 14, 24 to 30, 42. 
237kl41. 
§ 38—9-6. Petition to file lien—Notice to record interest holders—Summary 
relief—Contested petition 
(1) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 38-9-3 
may petition the district court in the county in which the document was 
rejected for an expedited determination that the lien may be recorded or filed. 
(2)(a) The petition shall be filed with the district court within ten days of the 
date notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity the 
grounds why the document should lawfully be recorded or filed. 
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the lien claim-
ant. 
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(d) If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the 
petition, notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an 
expedited hearing on all record interest holders of the property sufficiently in 
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advance or ihe nearing 10 enable any record inzeresi nolaei eo actenci the 
hearing and service shall be accomplished by certified or registered mail, 
(e) Any record interest holder cf the property has the right to attend and 
contest the petition. 
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document 
may lawfully be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder 
to accept the document for recording. If the petition is contested, the court may 
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or 
not a contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county recorder. 
The proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the document nor 
the property or legal rights of the parties beyond the necessary determination of. 
whether or not the document shall be recorded. The court's grant or denial of 
the petition under this section may not restrict any other legal remedies of any 
party, including any right to injunctive relief pursuant to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may 
not be expedited under this section. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 7, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Cross References 
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 54. 
Library References 
Lis Pendens <S=>12. C.J S. Lis Pendens §§11, 14, 24 to 30, 42. 
Records ®=3 to 7. QJS. Records §§ 4 to 14, 17 to 20. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 326k3 to 
326k7, 242kl2. 
§ 38-9—7. Petition to nullify lien—Notice to lien claimant—Summary re-
lief—Finding of wrongful lien—Wrongful lien is void 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien 
as defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court 
in the county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify 
the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a 
wrongful lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest 
holder. 
(3)(a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a 
hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrong ful 
lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien 
claimant and a nolicz, of the hearing pursuant to Pailes of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 4, Process. 
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Note 2 
(d) The hen claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or 
not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any 
other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of 
any party. 
(5)(a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the 
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding 
costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the petitioner. 
(b)(i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order 
with the county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property, 
(c) If the court determines that the claim_of lien is valid, the court shall 
dismiss the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to 
the lien claimant. The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the 
real property. The prevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy of 
the dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 38-9-1 , the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of 
claim or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may 
not be expedited under this section. 
Laws 1997, c. 125, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997. 
Cross References 
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 54 
Library References 
Libel and Slander @=3139 C J S Libel and Slander, Injurious Falsehood 
Liens o=»16 §§ 212 to 216 
Lis Pendens «^20 C J S Liens §§ 19 to 28 
W 2 3 9 k ? 6 1 § 7 k ? 3 9 n b e r S e a r C h 6 S ' 2 4 2 k 2 ° ' ' C J S Lis Pendens §§ 14, 24 to 30, 42 
Notes of Dec is ions 
Interest in real property 2 Thomas, 2000, 999 P 2d 1244, 391 Utah Adv. 
Notice of discharge 1 Rep. 19, 2000 UT App 82 Liens ®=> 16 
2. Interest in real property 
1. Notice of discharge Whether the interest retained by vendors was 
, , J j a n interest in land or a contractual right was 
The statutory notice of interest recorded governed by the purchase and development 
against real property was a "hen" or "encum- agreement executed by vendors and purchasers 
brance," within meaning of statute defining a Russell v Thomas, 2000, 999 P 2d 1244, 391 
'wrongful hen' m part as a lien or encum- Utah Adv Rep 19, 2000 UT App 82 Vendor 




MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE 
Section 
57-9-1. Whal constitutes marketable record title. 
57-9-2. Rights and interests to which marketable record title is subject. 
57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims, and charges. 
57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized—Effect of possession of land 
by record owner of possessory interest. 
57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest—Contents—Filing for record. 
57-9-6. Applicability of provisions. 
57-9-7. Existing statutes of limitations and recording statutes not affected. 
57-9-8. Definitions. 
57-9-9. Legislative purpose and construction. 
57-9-10. Extension of limitation period. 
§ 5 7 - 9 - 1 . What constitutes marketable record title 
Any person having the legal capacity to own land in this state, who has an 
unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for forty years or more, 
shall be deemed to have a marketable record- title to such interest as defined in 
section 57-9-8, subject only to the matters stated in section 57-9-2. A person 
shall be deemed to have such an unbroken chain of title when the official public 
records disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, of record not less than 
forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which said 
conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest, either in 
(1) the person claiming such interest or 
(2) some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title 
transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested in the person • 
claiming such interest: with nothing appearing of record, in either case, 
purporting to divest such claimant of such purported interest. 
Laws 1963, c. 109, § 1. 
Library References 
Vendor and Purchaser @=» 130(2). 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 400kl30(2). 
C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 326. 
R e s e a r c h Refe rences 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
3 Patton and Palomar on Land Titles § 563, 
Bar of Encumbrance by Laches, Statutes of 
Limitation, & Marketable Title Acts. 
ADDENDUM "C 
CHAPTER 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 
25-5-1 Ebtate or interest m real property 
25-5-2 Wills and implied trusts excepted 
25-5-3 Leases and contracts for interest m lands 
25-5-4 Certain agreements void unless written and signed 
25-5-5 Representation as to credit of third person 
25-5-6 Promise to answer for obligation of another—When not required to be m 
writing 
25-5-7 Contracts by telegraph deemed written 
25-5-8 Right to specific performance not affected 
25-5-9 Agent may sign for principal 
§ 25—5—1. instate or interest in real property 
No estate or interest m real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or 
m any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by acTbr operation of law, or by deed or convey-
ance m writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrender-
ing or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
Codifications R S 1898, §§ 1974, 2461, C L 1907, §§ 1974, 24612, C L 1917, §§ 4874, 5811, 
R S 1933, § 33-5-1 , C 1943,33-5-1 
Cross References 
Contract formation, statute of frauds, see § 70A-2-201 
Insurance rehabilitation, statute of frauds defense, see § 31A-27-314 
Investment securities, statute of frauds inapplicable, see § 70A-8-112 
Leases, statute of frauds, see § 70A-2a-201 et seq 
Personal property, statute of frauds, see § 70A-1-206 
Library References 
Frauds, Statute of <s=>55 to 71 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 185k55 to 
185k71 
Research References 
ALR Library 24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Trusts § 44 
6 A L R 2nd 1053, Performance as Taking Statutory References-Statutes of Fraud 
Contract Not to be Performed Within a 
Year Out of the Statute of Frauds Treatises and Practice Aids 
F o r m s 179 BNA Daily Report for Executives K-l l , 
23 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Statute of Frauds 1 9 9 9 ' R e a I P r o P e r t ? T a x F a c t s 
§ 2, Statutory References 179 BNA Daily Tax Report K- l l , 1999, Real 
24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Trusts § 3, Statu- Property Tax Facts 
tory References 
24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Trusts § 6, Statu- Treatises and Practice Aids, 
tory^ References Boge^t - The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 62, 
24 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms Trusts § 43, American Re-Enactments of the English 
Statutory References Statute 
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